Energy Prices, Subsidies and Resource Tax Reform in China

ZhongXiang Zhang
张中祥 复旦大学经济学院“千人计划”特聘教授
Distinguished University Professor and Chairman, Department of Public Economics,
School of Economics, Fudan University, Shanghai, China

Abstract

The Chinese leadership in November 2013 determined to embark upon a new wave of
comprehensive reforms in China. This is clearly reflected by the key decision of the
Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of Communist Party of China to assign the
market a decisive role in allocating resources. To have the market to play that role,
getting the energy prices right is crucial because it sends clear signals to both producers
and consumers of energy. While the overall trend of China’s energy pricing reform since
1984 has been moving away from the pricing completely set by the central government in
the centrally planned economy towards a more market-oriented pricing mechanism, the
pace and scale of the reform differ across energy types. This paper discusses the
evolution of price reforms for coal, petroleum products, natural gas and electricity in
China, provides some analysis of these energy price reforms, and suggests few areas of
reforms could take place in order to have the market to play a decisive role in allocating
resources and to help China’s transition to a low-carbon economy.
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1. Introduction
Before the post-1978 economic reform, China’s economic management structure was
modeled principally on that of the former Soviet Union, an essential feature of which was
the adoption of a united state pricing system. Under this pricing system, the state-set
prices of goods, including those of energy, did not reflect neither the production costs nor
the influence of market forces. The structure of state-set prices was also irrational: the
same type of goods was set at the same prices regardless of their qualities, thus resulting
in the underpricing and undersupply of goods of high quality. Over a very long period,
this pricing system remained unchanged so that its inflexible and restrictive nature
became increasingly apparent. Thus, the outdated pricing system had to be changed.
In 1984, the government required state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to sell up to a
predetermined quota of goods at state-set prices but allowed to sell above the quota or
surplus at prices within a 20 percent range above the state-set prices. In February 1985,
the 20 percent limit was removed and prices for surplus could be negotiated freely
between buyers and sellers (Wu and Zhao, 1987). At that point, the dual pricing system
was formally instituted. Such a pricing system introduced, among others, economic
efficiency in the use of resources and was generally considered a positive, cautious step
towards a full market price.1
Table 1 presents some data on plan and market prices as well as data on plan
allocations from a survey of 17 provincial markets. It can be seen that after four years of
introducing the dual pricing system there had continued to rely heavily on the plan in the
allocation of energy goods, particularly crude oil and electricity. This means that SOEs
still received allocation for part of their energy inputs at the state plan prices. As shown
in Table 1, however, the sate-set plan prices of energy goods were kept much lower than
their market prices. As a result, these enterprises have weak incentive for investment in
energy conservation.
Confronted with energy shortage and insufficient energy conservation investment,
China has been reforming its energy prices as part of sweeping price reforms initiated in
1993. The pace and scale of the energy pricing reform differ across energy types. This
paper discusses the evolution of price reforms for coal, petroleum products, natural gas
and electricity, provides some analysis of these energy price reforms, and suggests few
areas of reforms could take place in order to have the market to play a decisive role in
allocating resources.
1

See Wu and Zhao (1987) and Singh (1992) for general discussion on pros and cons of
the dual pricing system and Albouy (1991) for its impact on coal.
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Table 1
Ratio of market price to plan price, and percentage of plan allocation of selected goods by
volume and value, March 1989
Selected goods
Ratio of market
Percentage of plan
Percentage of plan
price to plan price
allocation by
allocation by value
volume
Crude oil
3.13
80
56
Heavy oil
2.60
41
13
Copper
2.50
17
7
Coal
2.49
46
21
Gasoline
2.25
64
44
Aluminum
2.24
28
15
Fertilizer
2.23
39
26
Timber
2.12
22
12
Diesel fuel
2.05
55
36
Steel products
2.05
30
19
Electric power
1.89
75
60
Nitric acid
1.82
40
20
Soda ash
1.81
40
28
Plate glass
1.63
41
29
Aluminum products 1.63
6
4
Caustic soda
1.60
47
24
Kerosene
1.60
73
67
Copper products
1.49
8
5
Cement
1.36
16
11
Iron ore
1.33
78
74
Pesticide
1.33
62
54
Sulphuric acid
1.30
40
32
Crude salt
1.23
86
83
Pig iron
1.10
47
42
Source: China Price, September 1990 (quoted in Zhang (1998)).

2. Coal prices
Coal dominates in China’s energy mix, accounting for 65.7 percent of total energy use in
2013. Its price has been set differently since 1993, depending on its use. Under a two
track system for coal prices, the price of coal for non-utility use, the so-called “market
coal”, was determined by the market, whereas the price of coal for utility use, the socalled “power coal”, was based on “guidance price” set by the National Development and
Reform Commission (NDRC), often at rates lower than prevailing market rates. Coal
producers are required to sell to large power producers at the controlled prices for utility
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coal (IEA, 2009). However, as the increasing portion of coal is used for utility and coal
prices have risen over the years while power tariffs remained fixed, electricity generators
found it increasingly difficult to obtain coal and cover the cost of generation (Rosen and
Houser, 2007). In 2004, NDRC abolished its guidance price for power coal and set price
bands for negotiations between coal producers and electricity generators. NDRC widened
those bands in 2005; in 2006 it scrapped them altogether (Williams and Kahrl, 2008).
With electricity tariffs remaining controlled and flat, many electricity generators
were unable to absorb the ensuing fuel cost increases and suffered huge losses. That
increased the risk of power shortages. To respond to electricity generators’ concerns,
NDRC proposed in May 2005 a coal-electricity price “co-movement” mechanism that
would raise electricity tariffs if coal prices rose by 5 percent or more in no less than six
months and allowed electricity generators to pass up to 70 percent of increased fuel costs
on to grid companies, and grid companies to pass costs on to consumers. However,
because of fears of inflation, the co-movement policy had not been implemented as the
conditions met, and power tariffs continue to remain flat while coal prices rise (Li, 2009;
Williams and Kahrl, 2008; Fisher-Vanden, 2009). This had put greater pressure on
electricity generators and led to lobbying efforts on the part of generators to receive
higher tariffs.
In December 2012, the State Council announced to abolish the two track system
for coal prices. The price of coal for utility use will also be determined by the market just
as the price of coal for non-utility use does. Moreover, it revises the coal-electricity price
“co-movement” mechanism. Under the revised mechanism, electricity tariffs would be
adjusted if fluctuations in coal prices go beyond by 5 percent or more in 12 months and
electricity generators are allowed to pass up to 90 percent of increased fuel costs on to
grid companies instead of the existing 70 percent threshold (The State Council, 2012b).
Given that electricity generators used to obtain coal at low prices and coal producers are
facing sluggish demands, both coal producers and electricity generators are gradually
adapting to each other under this changing market. As a reflection of the buyer market
situation, pricing for annual contract for utility coal in 2014 between two sides of coal
supply and demand has been very flexible, taking a multiple form on the yearly, quarterly
or monthly pricing basis, which did not experience before (Hu, 2014).
It should be pointed out that this new co-movement mechanism is not an
automatic trigger mechanism, implying that it may not be implemented even if the
conditions met. As has been the case, coal prices in the beginning of 2014 declined by
more than 5 percent relative to the prices one year ago, but the co-movement mechanism
has not been implemented. Unlike previous frictions between coal producers and
5

electricity generators when coal prices increased, this time, both coal producers and
electricity generators find that lowering power tariffs is not in their best interest and thus
do not like to see power tariffs to be cut (China Securities Journal, 2014; Tang, 2014).
For electricity generators, it is understandable because that will cut their profits. Besides,
they insist that they shouldered a lot of burden both for not raising power tariffs when the
conditions met in the earlier years and for mandating desulfurization and denitrification
(see Section 5.1). For coal producers, given sluggish demands for coal, 70 percent or
more of small coal mines in key coal-producing regions, such as Inner Mongolia and
Shanxi, have ceased production (Tang, 2014). There is a great concern that at this point
of the time, implementing the co-movement mechanism by lowering power tariffs will
make coal producers’ situations even worse because electricity generators are most likely
to pass through their profit losses to coal producers.

3. Petroleum product prices
Domestic crude oil prices have tracked international prices since 1998, but this has not
been the case with petroleum products. While China has since raised its producer prices
of gasoline and diesel several times, domestic oil refiners have still been feeling the pinch
as crude oil prices have been since linked directly to international prices and thus have
been allowed to rise, but refined oil product prices have not. To address this disconnect,
the government has implemented since May 2009 the pricing mechanism whereby
domestic petroleum product prices would be adjusted upward if the moving average of
international crude oil prices based on the composited Brent, Dubai and Cinta crude oil
price rose by more than 4 percent within 22 consecutive working days. Since its
implementation, China adjusted domestic petroleum product prices 25 times, with
upward adjustments 15 times and downward adjustments 10 times. However, this 22working-day cycle of price adjustments has triggered wide complaints, as it often failed
to reflect fluctuations in the international market.
To better reflect refiners’ costs and adapt to fluctuations in global crude oil prices,
NDRC launched in March 2013 a market-oriented petroleum product pricing mechanism.
This new automatic pricing mechanism will shorten the current 22-working-day
adjustment period to 10-working-day and remove the 4 percent threshold. The
composition of the basket of crudes, to which oil prices are linked, will also be adjusted
(Liu, 2012; Zhu, 2013). This new pricing mechanism means that China’s retail prices will
be subject to more frequent changes. Indeed, to the end of February 2014, or slightly less
than one year since its implementation, China adjusted domestic petroleum product prices
6

17 times, with upward adjustments 8 times, downward adjustments 9 times and no
adjustments 7 times (Jiang and Han, 2014). Clearly, this pace of adjustment is much
frequent compared to the aforementioned pricing mechanism introduced in May 2009.
These ups and downs of prices will better reflect the real cost of oil consumption and will
benefit China’s drive to save energy and abate emissions. However, this new pricing
mechanism is just one step towards a more market-oriented petroleum product pricing
mechanism. It is still not a complete liberalization of petroleum product prices because it
does not enable to reflect the relationship between its domestic supply and demand.

4. Natural gas prices
Given coal-dominated energy mix, increasing a share of cleaner fuel, like natural gas, has
been considered as the key option to meet the twin goal of meeting energy needs while
improving environmental quality. However, natural gas price has long been set below the
producers’ production costs, and does not reflect the relationship between its supply and
demand, or alternative fuel prices. This has not only led Chinese domestic gas producers
to be reluctant to increase investments in production, but also has constrained the imports
of more costly natural gas from abroad. On June 1, 2010, China increased domestic
producer price of natural gas by 25 percent (Wan, 2010). Since July 10, 2013, China
raised natural gas prices for non-residential users based on a two-tiered approach. Under
this reform, NDRC sets caps on city-gate gas prices for different provinces, instead of
setting the ex-factory prices for domestic onshore and imported piped gas, while
consumers and suppliers are allowed to negotiate their specific prices as long as the
prices do not exceed the ceilings. Moreover, a lower price is set for the 2012
consumption volume of 112 billion cubic meters, whose ceiling city-gate prices will not
increase by more than RMB 0.4 per cubic meter. A higher price is set for any volumes
above the 2012 consumption level. This price is pegged to 85 percent of the basket price
of alternative fuels such as fuel oil and liquefied petroleum gas using 60 percent and 40
percent weight respectively. The 85 percent is lower than that of the 90 percent of the
pilot scheme in Guangdong and Guangxi, resulting in an average city gate price of RMB
2.95 per cubic meter for any gas consumption exceeding the 2012 level. Overall, this
price reform would raise the city-gate wholesale price of natural gas to a national average
of RMB 1.95 per cubic meter from RMB 1.69 cubic meter (Xinhua Net, 2013). This
would represent an increase of 15.4 percent. The government aims to steadily raise the
lower tier prices so that both price bands converge to create a fully market-oriented gas
price by 2015.
7

Given that residential natural gas prices have been capped at much lower levels
than those for non-residential users, natural gas prices for residential users will undergo a
gradual increase. On June 1, 2010, China increased domestic producer price of natural
gas by 25 percent. On December 26, 2011, China carried out the pilot reform of natural
gas pricing mechanism in Guangdong province and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous
region. Widely considered as a breakthrough in China’s natural gas price reform, this
reform changes the existing cost-plus pricing method to the “netback market value
pricing” approach. Under this new pricing mechanism, pricing benchmarks are selected
and are pegged to prices of alternative fuels that are formed through market forces to
establish price linkage mechanism between natural gas and its alternative fuels. Gas
prices at various stages will then be adjusted accordingly on this basis (NDRC, 2011).
This new mechanism, which has been widely adopted in Europe, will better trace and
reflect market demand and resource supplies, as well as guiding reasonable allocations.
Provinces like Jiangsu, Henan and Hunan have implemented tier-tariffs for household use
of natural gas. NDRC announced in March 2014 to lunch this pricing mechanism across
the whole country before the end of 2015. The new pricing mechanism will set three
pricing bands associated with three tier levels of consumption, with the first covering 80
percent of the average monthly consumption volumes for household users, and the
second the next 15 percent. The third tier would cover any consumption above 95 percent
of the monthly household average. Consumption at the second and third tiers will be
accordingly charged at 120 percent and 150 percent of the first tier price (China
Economic Net, 2014). Based on the guidance and taking its own circumstance into
account, each province will determine the consumption volume at each tier level.
These price reforms and the aforementioned pilot scheme in Guangdong and
Guangxi help to establish a market-oriented natural gas pricing mechanism that fully
reflects demand and supply conditions. Gao et al. (2013) argue that it is feasible to
implement the Guangdong and Guangxi pilot reform program to the entire country, with
some adjustments and improvements regarding the choice of alternative fuels, the
selection of the pricing reference point and the creation of netback market value pricing
formula.

5. Electricity tariffs
Electricity tariffs have remained controlled by the central government since China split
State Power Corporation and separated electricity generation from its transmission and
distribution in 2002. While electricity tariffs were raised few times under the
8

aforementioned coal-electricity price “co-movement” mechanism, they still remain flat
and regulated. This not only reduces the effectiveness of addressing the daunting
challenges to cut emissions and strengthen industrial upgrading, but also complicates
implementing the pilot carbon trading schemes in the power sectors in China. The latter
creates a new impetus for power pricing reforms to allow the pass-through of carbon
costs in the electricity sector as a result of implementing carbon trading. While a
comprehensive power pricing reform will be an ideal option, the reality in China suggests
that this will not come any time soon. Until this long-awaited reform is undertaken, the
government has offered power price premium for desulfurization and denitrification, and
has charged differentiated power tariffs and tiered power tariffs.
5.1 Power price premium for desulfurization and denitrification
With one-third of China’s territory widely reported to be affected by acid rain, reducing
SO2 emissions has been the key environmental target in China. In its economic blueprint
for 2006 to 2010, China incorporated for the first time the goal of reducing SO2 emissions
by 10 percent by 2010. With burning coal contributing 90 percent of the national total
SO2 emissions and coal-fired power generation accounting for half of the national total,
the Chinese central government has mandated that new coal-fired units must be
synchronously equipped with a flue gas desulphurization (FGD) facility and that plants
built after 1997 must have begun to be retrofitted with a FGD facility before 2010.
To address unprecedented environmental pollution and health risks across the
country, electricity generators are mandated to install flue gas denitrification facility as
well during the 12th five-year period running from 2011 to 2015. All coal-fired plants
with unit capacity of 300 megawatt (MW) or more across the country and with unit
capacity of 200 MW in eastern part of the country and the capitals of other provinces or
equivalent are mandated to install denitrification facility. By 2015, all flue gas
desulfurization and denitrification facility installed needs to achieve the overall
desulfurization rate of 95 percent and the denitrification rate of at least 75 percent in
order for the power industry to cut SO2 emissions by 16 percent and NOx emissions by
29 percent by 2015 relative to 2010 levels (The State Council, 2012a).
While electricity tariffs remain controlled and flat, the government offered since
2004 a 0.015 RMB/kWh premium for all new coal-fired units. Given that China’s SO2
emissions in 2005 were mandated to keep at the 2000 level but actually were 5 percent
more than the 2000 level, the government decided to extend since 2007 a 0.015
RMB/kWh premium to electricity generated by existing coal-fired power plants (that is,
those built before 2004) with FGD facility installed to encourage the installation and
9

operation of FGD facility at large coal-fired power plants (NDRC and SEPA, 2007). The
premium was equivalent to the average estimated cost of operating the technology. Other
policies favorable to FGD-equipped power plants are implemented, e.g., priority given to
be connected to grids, and being allowed to operate longer than those plants that do not
install desulphurization capacity. Some provincial governments provide even more
favorable policies, leading to priority dispatching of power from units with FGD in
Shandong and Shanxi provinces. Moreover, the capital cost of FGD has fallen from 800
Yuan/kW in the 1990s to the level of about 200 Yuan/kW (Yu, 2006), thus making it less
costly to install FGD facility. As a result, newly installed desulphurization capacity in
2006 was greater than the combined total over the past 10 years, accounting for 30
percent of the total installed thermal (mostly coal-fired) capacity. By 2011, the coal-fired
units installed with FGD increased to 630 gigawatt (GW) from 53 GW in 2005.
Accordingly, the portion of coal-fired units with FGD rose to 90 percent in 2011 of the
total installed thermal capacity from 13.5 percent in 2005 (Sina Net, 2009; CEC and EDF,
2012). Based on the SO2 emissions data from 113 cities at the prefecture level from 2001
to 2010, Shi et al. (2014) found that with this price premium for desulfurization when the
number of power plants in a city increases by one, the SO2 reduction rate increases by
one percent, the amount of SO2 reduction increases by 3.5 percent, and the amount of
emission decreases by 1.2 percent. As a result of this incentive compatible policy, by the
end of 2009, China had cut its SO2 emissions by 13.14 percent relative to its 2005 levels
(Xinhua Net, 2010), having met the 2010 target of a 10 percent cut one year ahead of
schedule. Harvard China Project estimates that China’s SO2 reduction policy in the 11th
five-year plan period resulted in negative economic costs and enormous human health
benefits -- from 12,000 to 74,000 avoided premature deaths in 2010 (Nielsen and Ho,
2013).
The government also offered since November 2011 a 0.008 RMB/kWh premium
for electricity generated by power plants with flue gas denitrification facility in 14
provinces or equivalent. By the end of 2012, 27.6 percent of coal-fired units were
installed with denitrification facility, with the average rate of denitrification facility of 48
percent (Zhang, 2014). With 72 percent of existing coal-fired units having not been
equipped with denitrification facility, NOx emissions in 2012 rose, rather than reduced as
mandated. Given that this price premium is 15-20 percent lower than the projected NOx
control cost of a 0.0095 RMB/kWh (Harvard China Project, 2014), this result should not
come as a surprise.
Given this grim situation, since the beginning of 2013, the price premium for
denitrification was extended to all coal-fired power plants equipped with denitrification
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facility (NDRC, 2013a), and was further increased to 0.01 RMB/kWh since September
2013 (NDRC, 2013b). In 2013, the coal-fired units installed with denitrification facility
amounted to 190 GW, and NOx emissions were estimated to cut by 3.5 percent, the cut
for the first time below 2010 reference levels (Zhang, 2014). Based on estimates by
China Electricity Council, the average cost of denitrification is estimated to be 0.012
RMB/kWh for new plants and 0.015 RMB/kWh for plants already in operation. This cost
can go beyond 0.020 RMB/kWh for some specially designated plants. To comply with
the new NOx emissions standards of 100 mg/m3 by July 1, 2014, only taking
denitrification into consideration, retrofit costs for existing coal-fired units of 707 GW
are estimated to be Yuan 200-250 billion. Factoring in new addition of coal-fired units of
250 GW over the period 2006-10, the yearly operation costs of denitrification facility to
meet the new stringent standards are estimated to increase by Yuan 90-110 billion. This
will significantly increase the generation cost of coal-fired units, which is estimated to
increase by 20 percent in the short term (Li, 2013). Given the current level of price
premium for denitrification, this raises the issue of whether all coal-fired units will install
denitrification facility, and if installed, whether it will run continuously and reliably.
Given that it is much more costly to install and run denitrification facility than FGD
facility, and that field inspections reported that the installed FGD facilities are not in use
or do not run continuously and reliably (Liu, 2006; Xu et al., 2009; Zhang, 2011, 2012),
this can merit a great concern.
Indeed, given that the compliance costs may be higher than the offered price
premium and are increasing as emissions targets become increasingly stringent on the one
hand and that dodging of environmental regulations is widespread and common in China
on the other hand, implementation holds the key, and will determine whether or not to
actually achieve the desired outcomes. In its 2008 assessment of the total volume
reduction of major pollutants, the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) found that
FGD facilities of five coal-fired power plants were either in improper operation or their
on-line monitoring and control data were false. These plants were ordered to return the
compensation for their desulphurization costs in proportion to the time when their FGD
facilities were not in operation and to make necessary adjustments in the specified period
(Zhang, 2009). Based on its 2012 assessment of the total volume reduction of major
pollutants in all provinces or equivalent and eight central state-owned enterprises, MEP
issued the penalty on 15 enterprises involving improper operation of their desulfurization
facilities and monitoring desulfurization data falsification. These enterprises were ordered
not only to return the compensation for their desulphurization costs in proportion to the
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time when their desulfurization facilities were not in operation, but also had to pay a fine
up to five times that the compensation amount they received (Qin and Qi, 2013).

Table 2
Differentiated power tariffs for eight energy-guzzling industries in China
Existing
additional
charge
(Yuan/kWh)
Eight
Eliminated
energytypes
guzzling
Restrained
industries
types
Source: NDRC (2006).

0.05

Additional
charge since
1 October
2006
(Yuan/kWh)
0.10

Additional
charge since
1 January
2007
(Yuan/kWh)
0.15

Additional
charge since
1 January
2008
(Yuan/kWh)
0.20

0.02

0.03

0.04

0.05

5.2 Differentiated power tariffs
To shut down plants that are inefficient and highly polluting, and to keep the frenzied
expansion of offending industries under control, NDRC (2006) ordered provincial
governments to implement the differentiated tariffs that charge more for companies
classified as ‘eliminated types’ or ‘restrained types’ in eight energy-guzzling industries
including cement, aluminum, iron and steel, and ferroalloy from October 1, 2006
onwards (see Table 2). While provinces like Shanxi charged even higher differentiated
tariffs than the required levels by the central government (Zhang et al., 2011), some
provinces and regions have been offering preferential power tariffs to struggling, local
energy-intensive industries. The reason for this repeated violation is the lack of incentive
for local governments to implement this policy, because all the revenue collected from
these additional charges goes to the central government. To provide incentives for local
governments, this revenue should be assigned to local governments in the first place, but
the central government requires local governments to use the revenue specifically for
industrial upgrading, energy saving and emissions cutting (Zhang, 2007, 2010). In the
recognition of this flaw, the policy was adjusted in 2007 to allow local provincial
authorities to retain revenue collected through the differentiated tariffs, providing
stronger incentives for provincial authorities to enforce the policy (Zhou et al., 2010).
Partly for strengthening China’s longstanding efforts to restructure its inefficient heavy
industries, and partly faced with the prospect for the failure to meet the ambitious energy
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intensity target set for 2010, the NDRC and other five ministries and agencies jointly
ordered utilities to stop offering preferential power tariffs to energy-intensive industries
by June 10, 2010. Such industries will be charged with the punitive, differentiated tariffs.
Those utilities that fail to implement the differentiated tariffs will have to pay a fine that
is five times that of differentiated tariffs multiplied by the volume of sold electricity (Zhu,
2010).
5.3 Tiered power tariffs
With residential electricity demand set to increase as income grows on the one hand and
the price of residential electricity remaining below actual costs on the other hand, NDRC
implemented three-tier-tariffs for household electricity use. On July 1, 2012, 29 provinces
in China abolished single-block, low prices and set up the new, three-tier tariffs for
household electricity use. Under this new tariff system, the tier-one maintains the old
quota price that applies to, on average, 89 percent of households of 29 provinces and the
tier-two shifts to slightly higher electricity price for those electricity use exceeding the
amount of basic use, which is differentiated across regions, with the tier-three set much
higher tariffs for the amount of electricity for luxury use (People Net, 2012). The
effectiveness of the new tariff mechanism depends on the price and income elasticities of
residential electricity demand among income groups. However, very little information
exists in China regarding these parameters. Based on the monthly micro-level data of
Beijing urban households from 2002 to 2009, Jin and Zhang (2013) estimate these two
parameters with both the almost-ideal-demand-system and the linear double-logarithmic
model specifications. Their estimated price elasticity is close to unity and increases as
income grows. This suggests that it might be effective to use pricing policies for demandside management to adjust the electricity consumption of high-income groups. On the
other hand, given that the estimated income elasticity is low, supporting policies are
needed for low-income groups severely hit by increasing tariffs. In this regard, the
authors suggest that either directly subsidizing low-income families or rationally setting
the price levels of different tariff blocks can help improve the distributional effects of
tariff reform.
In December 2013, NDRC expanded the three-tiered electrify pricing approach to
the aluminum sector to phase out outdated production capacity and promote industrial
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restructuring more quickly. From the beginning of 2014, power tariffs remain unchanged
for aluminum smelters that do not use more than 13,700 kWh per ton of electrolytic
aluminum. Smelters that use more than 13,700 kWh but less than 13,800 kWh per ton
will charge an additional RMB 0.02 per kWh, and those smelters that consume more than
13,800 kWh per ton will charge an additional RMB 0.08 per kWh. Moreover, smelters
that consume more than 13,700 kWh per ton are not allowed to directly purchase
electricity from power plants (NDRC and MIIT, 2013; Gao, 2013). Similar tiered power
pricing policy is expected to implement in other industries, such as cement, to force
upgrades in the drive for sustained and healthy development.

6. Energy subsidies
Even if the aforementioned price of coal for non-utility use, the so-called “market coal”,
has been determined by the market, it does not fully reflect the cost of production. Mao et
al. (2008) estimate that if the government’s controlled costs and the distorted prices in
other production factors, such as land and resources, are factored in, the cost of coal
would increase by 54 percent. If externalities such as conventional environmental and
health impacts are added, the cost of coal would go up by 70 percent. The negative
externalities do not include damage costs of global climate change as a result of CO2 and
other greenhouse gas emissions, and are therefore underestimated. Even if the
conservative estimate puts the economic costs of coal exploration, transportation and use
at Yuan 1745 billion in 2007, or 7.1 percent of that year’s gross domestic product (GDP)
(Mao et al., 2008). Differing from this estimate and other estimates shown in Figure 1
and Table 3 by the ADB (2014) and the IEA (2014), International Monetary Fund (IMF)
factors in damage costs of global climate change. Assuming the costs of US$25 per ton of
CO2 equivalent, post-tax coal subsidies, namely the sum of pre-tax and tax subsidies, are
estimated to be US$ 236 billion in 2011 in China, or 3.23 percent of that year’s GDP.
Compared with the amount of post-tax subsidies for petroleum products, natural gas and
electricity, which amounted to 0.20 percent, 0.09 percent, and 0.30 percent of GDP in
2011 respectively, post-tax coal subsidies are substantial (Clements et al., 2013). This is
mainly because coal dominates in China’s energy mix, accounting for accounting for 65.7%
of total energy use in 2013 and because coal prices are far below the levels needed to
address negative environmental and health externalities.
A subsidy is made of producer subsidy and consumer subsidy. A producer
subsidy increases the price received by producers, while a consumer subsidy lowers the
price paid by consumers. Measured on a tax-inclusive basis, virtually all of the world’s
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economies provide energy subsidies of some kind (IEA, 2006 and 2014; Zhang, 2008;
Clements et al., 2013). Such subsidies differ by energy type across countries. As a share
of GDP, post-tax subsidies are roughly eight times larger in the Middle East and North
African region than in advanced economies. In absolute terms, the US, China and Russia
are the top three subsidizers across the world, providing subsidies of US$ 502 billion,
US$ 279 billion, and US$ 116 billion in 2011, respectively (Clements et al., 2013).
Widespread use of energy subsidies leads to inefficient production and use of energy and
resources, creates no incentive for energy and resource conservation, and gives rise to
significant amount of emissions that can otherwise be avoided if subsidies are removed
and energy prices get right. By lowering the prices of fossil fuels, such fossil fuel
subsidies also are widely considered to distort international trade (Zhang and Assunção,
2004).
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Figure 1 Estimates of fossil fuel consumption subsidies in China (US$ billion), 2007-12
Source: Drawn based on data from the IEA (2014).
Clearly, removing these subsidies is essential to provide incentives for investment
and production of cleaner energy on the supply side and efficient energy use and adoption
of clean technologies on the demand side that reduce emissions at sources. This helps the
economic recovery in the short term and serves as the driver of sustainable and balanced
economic growth in the long run. Thus, in 2009, the Group of 20 advanced and emerging
market economies called for a phase out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies in all countries,
and reaffirmed this again in 2012. Eliminating energy subsidies would generate
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substantial environmental benefits. IMF estimates that raising energy prices to levels
would eliminate tax-inclusive subsidies for petroleum products, natural gas and coal
would reduce 4.5 billion tons of CO2 emissions, representing a 13 percent cut in global
energy-related CO2 emissions (Clements et al., 2013).
Table 3
Estimates of fossil fuel consumption subsidies in selected countries
ADB estimates in IEA estimates in
IMF pre-tax
IMF post-tax
2011-12
2012
estimates in 2011 estimates in 2011
US$ bn % GDP US$ bn % GDP US$ bn % GDP US$ bn % GDP
China
NA
NA
26.7
0.3
11
0.15
279
3.82
India
48.8
2.66
42.8
2.3
NA
1.74
NA
4.46
Indonesia
36.0
4.12
26.5
3.0
NA
3.24
NA
5.36
Thailand
7.0
1.92
9.6
2.6
NA
2.18
NA
4.72
Russia
NA
NA
46.2
2.3
38
2.08
116
6.29
US
NA
NA
13*
NA
6
0.05
502
3.33
*
Notes: The IEA estimate for the US is 2011; NA—not available.
Sources: ADB (2014), Clements et al. (2013), IEA (2014), OECD (2012).

7. Putting resource taxes and reform in context
In physical terms, on average, coal production in China increased yearly by 200 million
tons over the past 10 years, but increased by 50 million tons in 2013; in percentage terms,
coal use increased yearly by 9 percent over the past 10 years, but increased by 2.6 percent
in 2013. If strict measures would be taken, coal consumption could be estimated to peak
in 2015-2020, with the resulting CO2 emissions estimated to peak in 2025-2030, and
coal’s share in the total energy mix would be estimated to be below 50 percent in 2030
(Wang, 2014).
The imposition of environmental taxes or carbon taxes clearly helps to keep coal
use under control. The Chinese legislature is considering the revision of existing
environmental law and the promulgating of environmental tax law. However, this
legislation process takes time, and until it is completed, there is no legal basis to
authorize the levy of these taxes.
To avoid wasteful extraction and use of resources while alleviating the financial
burden of local governments, China needs to reform its current coverage of resource
taxation and to significantly increase the levied level. Since the tax-sharing system was
adopted in China in 1994, taxes are grouped into taxes collected by the central
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government, taxes collected by local governments and taxes shared between the central
and local governments. All those taxes that have steady sources and broad bases and are
easily collected, such as the consumption tax, tariffs and vehicle purchase tax, are
assigned to the central government. VAT and income tax are split between the central
and local governments, with 75 percent of VAT and 60 percent of income tax going to
the central government. This led the share of the central government in the total
government revenue to go up to 55.7 percent in 1994 from 22.0 percent in the previous
year. In the meantime, the share of the central government in the total government
expenditure just rose by 2 percent. By 2009, local governments only accounted for 47.6
percent of the total government revenue, but their expenditure accounted for 80.0 percent
of the total government expenditure in China. To enable to pay their expenditure for
culture and education, supporting agricultural production, social security subsidiary, and
so on, local governments have little choice but to focus on local development and GDP.
That will in turn enable them to enlarge their tax revenue by collecting urban
maintenance and development tax, contract tax, arable land occupation tax, urban land
use tax, and so on (Zhang, 2008, 2011).
Alleviating the financial burden of local governments is one avenue to incentivize
them not to focus on economic growth alone. Enlarging their tax revenue is the key to
helping them cover a disproportional portion of the aforementioned government
expenditure. In the tax-sharing system adopted in 1994, onshore resource taxes are
assigned to local governments, while the central government is collecting revenues from
resource taxes offshore. In 1984, resource taxes have been levied at Yuan 2–5 per ton of
raw coal and Yuan 8 per ton of coking coal, with the weighted average of Yuan 3.5 per
ton of coal. For crude oil, the corresponding tax is levied at Yuan 8–30 per ton. While the
prices of coal and oil have significantly increased since 1984, the levels of their resource
taxes have remained unchanged over the past 25 years (Zhang, 2011). As a result, the
resource taxes raised amounted to only Yuan 33.8 billion, accounting for about 0.57
percent of China’s total tax revenues and about 17.5 percent of the national government
expenditure for environmental protection that amounted to Yuan 193.4 billion in 2009
(NBS, 2010). Therefore, to avoid wasteful extraction and use of resources while
alleviating the financial burden of local governments, the way of levying taxes on
resources in China should be changed.
Economic theory suggests that resource rent taxes are preferable to resource
revenue taxes because the latter introduces distortion and thus imposes the more
economic burden (e.g., Garnaut, 2010). However, given the difficulty of accurate
measurement of “costs”, as required for a rent tax, such resource taxation should be
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levied based on revenues, rather than volume. In addition, current resource taxes are only
levied on seven types of resources including coal, oil and natural gas. This coverage is
too narrow, falling far short of the purposes of both preserving resources and protecting
the environment. Thus, overhauling resource taxes also includes broadening their
coverage so that more resources will be subject to resource taxation.
Clearly, broadening the current coverage of resource taxation and significantly
increasing the levied level also help to increase local government’s revenues while
conserving resources and preserving the environment. The Chinese central government
started a pilot reform on resource taxation in Xinjiang, China’s northwestern border area
of abundant resources and numerous opportunities for growth and expansion. Since June
1, 2010, crude oil and natural gas are taxed by revenues rather than volume in Xinjiang.
While it is enacted as part of a massive support package to help Xinjiang achieve
leapfrog-like development, which is considered a strategic choice to deepen the country’s
Western Development Strategy and tap new sources of economic growth for China, this
new resource tax will help to significantly increase the revenues for Xinjiang. It is
estimated that the new resource tax levied at a rate of 5 percent will generate additional
annual revenues of Yuan 4–5 billion for Xinjiang (Dai, 2010). This is a significant
increase, in comparison with the total resource tax revenues of Yuan 1.23 billion in 2009,
inclusive of those from other resources than crude oil and natural gas (NBS, 2010). This
will contribute to 17–21 percent of the total tax revenues for Xinjiang, in comparison
with the contribution level of about 4.1 percent in 2009.
The resource tax levied on crude oil and natural gas by revenues rather than by
existing extracted volume, which was applied nationwide since November 1, 2011, is the
first step in the right direction. There have been intensified discussions on levying
resource tax on coal by revenues along this line. It is most likely that China will overhaul
the current practice and levy on coal by revenues in 2014. Coal-rich provinces, like
Shanxi and Inner Mongolia, have studied options to levy on coal by revenues. The tax
rates are proposed to be in the range of 2-10 percent, depending on the extent to which
current fees and charges are cut or abolished. Specifically, assuming coal price of Yuan
465 per ton, Shanxi proposes to levy at 2.2 percent if the charge for coal sustainable
development fund (which charges Yuan 8-23 per ton, depending on the type of coal)
remains; 7.4 percent if that charge is abolished. If coal price is assumed at Yuan 440 per
ton, then Shanxi proposes to levy at 2.4 percent if the charge for coal sustainable
development fund remains; 7.6 percent if that charge is abolished (Xing, 2013; Wang et
al., 2014).
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8. Conclusions
The Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of Communist Party of China in
November 2013 strongly signaled the Chinese leadership’s determination to embark upon
a new wave of comprehensive reforms in China. This is clearly reflected by the Plenum’s
key decision of assigning the market a decisive role in allocating resources. To have the
market to play that role, getting the energy prices right is crucial because it sends clear
signals to both producers and consumers of energy. Since 1984, China has been
reforming energy prices. While the overall trend of such energy pricing reform has been
moving away from the pricing completely set by the central government in the centrally
planned economy towards a more market-oriented pricing mechanism, the pace and scale
of the reform differ across energy types.
Coal pricing reform has been most extensively in terms of both pace and scope.
The dual pricing system was introduced in 1984 wherein enterprises were required to sell
up to a predetermined quota of coal at prices that were set by the central government but
were allowed to sell above the quota at prevailing market prices. As part of sweeping
price reforms initiated in 1993, the price of coal has since been set differently, depending
on use. Under a two track system, the price of coal for non-utility use, the so-called
“market coal”, would be determined by the market. But the price of coal for utility use,
the so-called “power coal”, was based on “guidance price” set by the NDRC, often at
rates substantially below prevailing market prices. In 2004, NDRC abolished its guidance
price for power coal and set price bands for negotiations between coal producers and
electricity generators. NDRC widened those bands in 2005, and scrapped them altogether
in 2006. NDRC proposed in May 2005 a coal-electricity price “co-movement”
mechanism that would allow electricity tariffs to be raised if coal prices rose by 5 percent
or more in no less than six months. This mechanism also allowed electricity generators to
pass up to 70 percent of increased fuel costs on to grid companies. In December 2012, the
State Council announced the abolition of the two track system for coal prices, allowing
the price of coal for utility use to be determined by the market just as the price of coal for
non-utility use does. Moreover, it revises the coal-electricity price “co-movement”
mechanism, allowing adjustment in electricity tariffs if fluctuations in coal prices go
beyond by 5 percent or more in 12 months and electricity generators to pass up to 90
percent of increased fuel costs on to grid companies instead of the existing 70 percent
threshold.
Similar to coal, a dual pricing system for crude oil was introduced in 1984, and
was virtually eliminated in 1993. Since 1998 domestic crude oil prices have tracked
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international prices, but refined oil product prices have not. To address this disconnect,
the government has, since May 2009, implemented the pricing mechanism whereby
domestic petroleum product prices would be adjusted upward if the moving average of a
basket of international crude oil prices, on a composite basis, rise by more than 4 percent
within 22 consecutive working days. To better reflect refiners’ costs and adapt to
fluctuations in global crude oil prices, in March 2013 NDRC launched an automatic
petroleum product pricing mechanism, shortening the 22-working-day adjustment period
to 10-working-day and removing the 4 percent threshold. The government also decided to
adjust the composition of the basket of crude to which oil prices are linked.
Reforms have also been undertaken for natural gas prices. A breakthrough in the
reform area has been changing the existing cost-plus pricing to the “netback market value
pricing” in Guangdong province and the Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region. Under this
new pricing mechanism, pricing benchmarks are selected and pegged to prices of
alternative fuels, which are formed through market forces, to establish a price linkage
between natural gas and its alternative fuels. Gas prices at various stages will then be
adjusted accordingly on this basis. Before introducing the Guangdong and Guangxi pilot
reform program to the entire country, NDRC plans to implement three-tier-tariffs for
household use of natural gas across the whole country before the end of 2015. These
price reforms and the pilot scheme in Guangdong and Guangxi help to establish a marketoriented natural gas pricing mechanism that fully reflects demand and supply conditions.
The government still retains control over electricity tariffs. But in order to
encourage coal-fired power plants to install and operate flue gas desulfurization and
denitrification facility it has offered, since 2004, a price premium on electricity generated
by coal-fired power plants with FGD facility installed and, since November 2011, a price
premium for electricity generated by power plants with flue gas denitrification facility.
The level and scope of the price premium were amended since their initial
implementation in order to achieve the mandated emissions reductions. From October
2006, China has also charged differentiated power tariffs for companies classified as
‘eliminated types’ or ‘restrained types’ in eight energy-guzzling industries. From July
2012 NDRC implemented three-tier-tariffs for household electricity use, and since
January 2014 the three-tiered electrify pricing approach has been expanded to the
aluminum sector in order to phase out outdated production capacity and speed up
industrial restructuring. A similar tiered power pricing policy is expected to be introduced
in other industries, such as cement, to force upgrades in the drive for sustained and
healthy development.
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Clearly, China has made great efforts towards reforming energy prices. However,
such reforms are far from complete. While the new pricing mechanism for petroleum
products is one step towards a more market-oriented system, it is still not a full
marketisation. Petroleum product price fluctuates along with global crude oil prices, but
decouples from the domestic market. The future reform of petroleum product pricing
mechanism should take domestic factors into account so that petroleum product prices
can better reflect the relationship between domestic supply and demand. From a longterm perspective, however, liberalizing petroleum product prices needs to go far beyond
this. The success will depend on the extent to which the central government is able to
break down the monopoly power of the three national oil corporations in oil imports,
exploration, production and pipeline networks.
The aforementioned pilot schemes in Guangdong and Guangxi provide the right
direction to establish a market-oriented natural gas pricing mechanism. China needs to
take lessons learned from the two pilot schemes and examine what kinds of adjustments
and improvements are needed regarding the choice of alternative fuels, the selection of
the pricing reference point and the creation of netback market value pricing formula in
order to implement the Guangdong and Guangxi pilot reform program to the entire
country.
While China has been reforming its electricity industry structure since 2002,
transmission, distribution and sale of electricity are undertaken by two main grid
companies, State Grid and China Southern Power Grid, and several local grid companies,
such as Inner Mongolia Grid and Shaanxi Grid. As the designated sole buyers of
electricity from generators, and distributors and sellers of electricity, they hold
monopolies in their respective areas. Their monopoly power and the lack of competition
in the electricity market have often attracted criticism. However, in my view, separation
of transmission and distribution is not a viable option. The feasible approach should start
reforming electricity sale side by setting up the electricity power trading market. The
direct purchase for major electricity users, as piloted in Yunnan province, should be
actively promoted. This would help to infer the actual cost of electricity transmission and
its effective distribution and help government to set the appropriate level of the grid’s
transmission and distribution charges in future electricity power structure reform. While
splitting grid is not a necessary option to achieve this goal, separating electricity sale
from grid’s transmission and distribution is a must for establishing a competitive power
market. Only then can the electricity sale side be opened up, and electricity selling
companies independent of grids, can be set up in each region. As such, an open
nationwide electricity power market will be established to create a market-based system
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for electricity pricing. These are considered the most realistic options for pushing forward
power reforms. In the meantime, given that meeting the goal of cutting NOx emissions
has lagged far behind the schedule for the 12th five-year plan as a result of the high costs
and hence the reluctance of coal-fired power plants to install and operate denitrification
facilities, the government could also consider raising the current level of price premium
for denitrification in order to encourage the installation of such plants and run
denitrification facilities continuously and reliably.
For coal, though the two track system for coal prices has been abolished, it is still
very difficult to establish a nationwide coal market as railway freight capacity has not
been liberalized. Given uneven geographical distribution of coal production and
economic output, coal has to be transported over the long distance to the load centers,
with over 40 percent of the total freight shifted by railways having been coal since 1980s
(Zhang, 1998; Tu, 2013). This means that if the train wagons are not included for
liberalizing, coal purchased cannot reach the load centers. Thus, future reform has to be
undertaken from a perspective of a whole coal value chain, targeting reform of those
parts of the whole value chain, which need to be liberalized but are, to a large extent, still
controlled by the government.
However, even if such reform is undertaken, coal prices would not fully reflect
the cost of production because of officially controlled costs and distorted prices in other
production factors. Coal prices also do not include negative externalities. Clearly, the
imposition of environmental taxes or carbon taxes can internalize externality costs into
the market prices. In terms of timing, given that China has not levied environmental taxes
yet, it is better to introduce environmental taxes first, not least because such a distinction
will enable to disentangle China’s additional efforts towards carbon abatement from
those broad energy-saving and pollution-cutting ones (Zhang, 2011). And given the
ongoing lengthy legislation process to authorize the levy of these taxes, as well as the
pressing need to avoid wasteful extraction and use of resources, China needs to reform its
current narrow coverage of resource taxation and to significantly increase the tax level.
The resource tax levied on crude oil and natural gas on a revenue basis, rather than by
existing extracted volume, which has been applied nationwide since November 1, 2011,
is a step in the right direction. China should broaden that reform to coal by overhauling
the current practice and impose the levy on coal by revenues. This would also help to
increase local government’s revenues, alleviate their financial burden and incentivize
them not to focus on economic growth alone.
Implementing carbon trading not only creates a new impetus for power pricing
reforms to allow the pass-through of carbon costs in the electricity sector, but can also
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help internalize externality costs into the market prices. Aligned with the implementation
of low-carbon provinces and low-carbon cities in six provinces and thirty-six cities,
China is experimenting the seven pilot carbon trading schemes. These pilot trading
schemes share some in common but have differing features, and have been put into
operation since June 2013, respectively. Based on these piloted schemes, China aims to
establish a national carbon trading scheme before 2020.
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